

An Attribution Model of Social Conflict and Violence: From Psychological to Intergroup Phenomena

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This work begins with an analysis of an attribution-emotion model of conflict and violence based on research on individual and interpersonal phenomena. The logic and feasibility of applying psychological knowledge based on the study of individuals to more complex social problems such as intergroup and social violence are discussed. Then, a version of the model adapted for the study of intergroup conflict and violence is presented. Specifically, previous work on the ultimate attribution error is re-examined and the principle reformulated in order to account for group biases in the relevant aspects of attributional thinking, emotions, and violence of responses to frustration or instigation in conflict environments. Finally, evidence from studies designed to test the new model, extended to account for intergroup and related social phenomena, is discussed.

Este trabajo comienza con un análisis de un modelo de atribución-emoción sobre conflicto y violencia basado en investigaciones acerca de fenómenos individuales e interpersonales. Se discute la lógica y factibilidad de la aplicación de conocimientos psicológicos basados en estudios de individuos a problemas sociales más complejos tales como violencia intergrupala y social. Luego se presenta una versión del modelo adaptado para el estudio del conflicto y la violencia intergrupala. Específicamente se reexaminan trabajos previos sobre el *error atribucional máximo* y se reformula este principio para dar cuenta de sesgos grupales en aspectos relevantes del pensamiento atribucional, las emociones y las respuestas de violencia a la frustración o instigación en situaciones de conflicto. Finalmente se discute evidencia de un número de estudios diseñados para probar el nuevo modelo extendido para dar cuenta de fenómenos intergrupales y sociales.

Since the end of the cold war, intergroup violence has become a major concern in many regions of the world. At the same time, international agencies and local governments have become more aware of the importance of social peace as a basic ingredient of human welfare and development. A logical consequence of such awareness has been an enhanced interest in the understanding and prevention of destructive conflict and violence, which represent major challenges to social psychology.

The study of destructive conflict and violence has always been an area of interest in social psychology. However, some of the issues that have dominated social psychology in recent years, such as social cognition and the cognition-

emotion relationship, have not received a great deal of attention in relation to aggression and violence. For example, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, even after the reformulation that conceived anger as a mediator between frustration and aggression (e.g., Berkowitz, 1983, 1990), does not include cognitive processes such as attributional thinking. In addition, it does not consider the role of other emotions, such as empathic feelings, which have been found to relate negatively to aggression in a number of studies (e.g., Miller & Eisenberg, 1988).

The main objective of this article is to examine group violence in conflict environments from the perspective of an approach that is based on the study of social-cognitive processes, specifically attributional thinking, and the cognition-emotion relationship. Although the emphasis is on factors that are psychological in nature, in no way it is suggested that these are exclusive or even totally independent of other determinants. In fact, in addition to their role as antecedents of conflict and violence, these psychological processes are thought to mediate or moderate the influence of more distal factors, such as cultural or situational determinants.

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The Attribution-Emotion Model of Violence: Beginning with Interpersonal Phenomena

The attribution-emotion model of violence developed by Betancourt and his associates (e.g., Betancourt, 1990; Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Guthrie & Betancourt, 1991), which is based on research dealing with conflict and aggression at the interpersonal level, is rooted in the more general attribution theory of motivation and emotion (for reviews, see Weiner, 1985, 1986, 1995). According to this theory, following a behavioral outcome, a cognitive-motivational process is initiated, which begins with a search for the causes of the outcome and leads to an attribution of causality. This cognitive process influences emotions and has important consequences for motivation and action. A central aspect of the theory is that some of the characteristics or properties of the causes to which one attributes an outcome are associated with specific psychological consequences.

These characteristics of attributions, mainly locus, stability, and controllability of causes, defined as general properties, influence one's emotions, motivation, and action in a variety of behavioral settings (see Weiner, 1986, 1995). In addition, there

are other properties of attributions that are only relevant in a particular behavioral domain. For instance, globality of attributions has been found to be important in understanding helplessness and depression (e.g., Seligman, 1984), but not in other areas. Similarly, attribution of intentionality has been observed to be an influential factor in interpersonal feelings, judgments, and responses to antisocial behavior (e.g., Betancourt, 1991, Betancourt & Blair, 1992) but may be irrelevant in other domains.

The attribution-emotion model of violence (see Figure 1) incorporates controllability, a general property of causes to which one attributes an outcome, and intentionality as components of the same thinking (attribution) process. However, both of these variables are thought to represent distinct aspects of the attribution process. While controllability refers to the presence or absence of the ability to cause an event, intentionality refers to the presence or absence of the motivation to bring about specific consequences (Betancourt & Blair, 1992). Although both of these aspects of the attribution process are considered to be important as determinants of emotion and violent action in conflict environments, other aspects of the attribution process or social cognition in general may also play a role.




Figure 1. Relationships among the variables of the Attribution-Emotion Model of Violence (from Betancourt & Blair, 1992).

The relationships between these attribution processes, the situational (e.g., frustrating) antecedents, and interpersonal emotions as determinants of violence, as represented in Figure 1, can be summarized in the three general propositions of the model. First, violence or responses to a frustrating or aggressive action in a conflict situation is proposed to be a function of both, the attributional thinking (perceived intentionality of the action and controllability of its cause) and the levels of interpersonal emotions (e.g., anger and sympathy). High levels of controllability and intentionality as well as high levels of anger and low levels of empathic emotions are related to higher levels of violent responding. Second, attributional thinking as well as interpersonal emotions are proposed to be at least in part a function of frustrating or other situational factors, such as aspects of the situation suggesting intentionality of the action and controllability of its cause. Finally, the effect of attributional thinking on violent responding is proposed to be in part mediated by interpersonal emotions. High levels of controllability and intentionality are associated with higher levels of anger and lower levels of empathic emotions.

One of the important features of these propositions, and the resulting model, is that it corrects a deficiency of traditional approaches, such as the frustration-aggression hypothesis (see Berkowitz, 1983, 1989), which ignores the role of cognition and the cognition-emotion connection as determinants of anger and aggression. In fact, this attribution model includes the basic proposition of that approach, which is represented

by the direct relationship between the situational (frustrating) determinants, anger, and violence (see Figure 1). However, within this model, that is only part of the picture and the focus is on the cognition-emotion relationship as mediating determinants between the situational factors and violence.

For instance, when somebody steps on one's toes or pushes one out of line in a supermarket, if one perceives the action as intentional (intended to cause harm), one experiences a higher level of anger than if one perceives the same action as not intentional. In turn, a higher level of anger results in a higher probability of an aggressive or violent response. In addition, it is also possible that just because one perceives the action to be intentional, as compared to unintentional, one may tend to respond more aggressively, independent of the level of anger.

This attribution-emotion model of violence was tested in a series of experiments that examined each of the propositions. The outcome for the test of the model using Bentler's (1989) program for the analysis of structural equations is presented in Figure 2. As observed, the model fit the data very well, $X^2(9) = 11.48$, $p = .24$, $NFI = .977$, $NNFI = .988$, $CFI = .995$. (for details, see Betancourt & Blair, 1992). In addition to confirming the role of anger as a mediating determinant of violent reactions to a frustrating (instigating) incident, as proposed by the frustration-aggression hypothesis, the role of empathic emotions and that of cognitive (attributional) processes on emotion and action are supported.




Figure 2. EQS Output for a test of the Attribution-Emotion Model of Violence based on the Analysis of Structural Equations, $X^2(9) = .24$; $NFI = .977$; $*=p < .05$ (from Betancourt & Blair, 1992).

From Psychological Processes to Intergroup Conflict and Social Violence

Although most of the research in social psychology takes place at the individual and interpersonal level of analysis, social psychologists have traditionally been preoccupied with intergroup and social violence, at the national as well as international levels (e.g., Austin & Worchel, 1979; Blight, 1987; Deutsch, 1973; Kelman, 1983; Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, & Hewston, 1988; White, 1986). This application of psychological knowledge from research with individuals to groups and society at large was already a concern of some of the pioneers in the study of groups in social psychology. For example, Sheriff (e.g., 1966), who warned against the excessive use knowledge from research with individuals to the analysis of intergroup relations and similar phenomena, indicated that individual behavior and processes, such as those dealing with aggression, competition, and cooperation, are important and should be considered in the analysis of intergroup or social conflict. As an illustration, Sheriff suggested that when groups are in conflict, their members blame, recriminate, and judge each other, which leads to a vicious cycle and persistence of conflict. Although Sheriff knew little of what we know today about processes such as attribution of causality, blame, and related emotions as determinants of responses to an instigation, what he was talking about is very much representative of the psychological processes this article deals with, in relation to conflict and violence.

Another illustration of how psychological phenomena applies to the understanding of intergroup and more complex political and social phenomena is found in the work of Kelman and his associates (Kelman, 1987) concerning the interactional approach to international conflict resolution. According to Kelman, psychological processes that take place in interactions between conflicting parties can produce changes at the individual level, which facilitate change at the social or international policy level. Even in cases when the solution to a conflict requires a political process, often there are psychological barriers that can make that political process and the solution to the conflict impossible. The study of psychological processes, such as social cognition and emotions, represents important potential contributions to understanding the interactions between individuals and groups that can lead to destructive conflict and violence.

Attribution Processes in Intergroup Conflict and

Violence. Until recently, only limited aspects of attribution processes had been studied in relation to social and intergroup conflict and violence. Specifically, in most of the attempts to apply attribution principles to intergroup and international conflict and violence (e.g., Hewstone, 1988; Horai, 1977; Kelman, 1983; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974), locus of control is the only aspect of attributional thinking that has received significant attention. For example, it has been suggested that in a conflict situation one tends to attribute the negative behaviors of other individuals to dispositional (internal) causes rather than to situational (external) causes. However, locus is only one of the three general properties of attributions identified as relevant in predicting motivation and action (see Weiner, 1986, 1995).

The dimensional properties of causal attributions are important because the individual's perception of a cause in terms of its properties is assumed to be mostly responsible for the psychological effects and subsequent behavior. More over, each of the general properties or dimensions of attributions—locus, stability, and controllability—has specific psychological consequences, such as esteem-related affects, expectancy change, and interpersonal emotions and reactions. In the case of attributions concerning the behavior or outcomes of other individuals, perceived controllability is the main attributional property which influences interpersonal feelings, evaluations, and reactions (see Weiner, 1986, 1995). In other words, what matters in understanding one's feelings and responses to another person's instigation or negative behavior is whether the cause of the action was controllable or uncontrollable, not whether it was internal or external. In addition, since those aspects of attributional thinking that are most relevant to interpersonal phenomena are also likely to be relevant to intergroup and social phenomena in general, an approach based on the attribution-emotion model of conflict and violence (see Figures 1 and 2 above) should be most useful in dealing with group violence.

Extending the Attribution-Emotion Model to Intergroup Conflict and Violence

The first attempt to examine intergroup and international conflict and violence based on the attribution principles of Weiner's (1986, 1995) theory of motivation used controllability as the general property of attributions (see Betancourt, 1990).

Based on a set of propositions similar to those underlying the model presented in Figure 1, Betancourt (1990) examined the work of Kelman and colleagues on the Middle East conflict. In his social psychological assessment of the prospects for a resolution of the conflict, Kelman (1983) provided an analysis of a series of conversations with Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and members of the government in Israel. However, in his analysis Kelman only considered locus of causality and not controllability of the attributions each part made for the behavior and outcomes of members of the other group.

For instance, Kelman examined the tendency in the opponents of the PLO to dismiss Arafat's changes toward a more compromising position, attributing those changes to situational (external) causes, such as a deceptive tactic motivated by external pressures that made it necessary to maintain a good public image. At the same time, they continued to attribute any hostile statements and actions to internal causes such as a commitment to eliminate Israel or Zionism. According to Kelman, these kinds of attributions lead Israel and others to disregard any positive change on the part of Arafat, contributing to the persistence of psychological barriers that had made direct negotiations impossible.

Based on the basic propositions of his attribution-emotion model of interpersonal conflict and violence (see Figure 1), Betancourt (1990) examined the issues that Kelman had been dealing with. For instance, he incorporated controllability of the attributions made by Israelis and Palestinians as the key element to predict the interpersonal phenomena, such as emotions and reactions, relevant to the resolution of the conflict. Specifically, if Israel attributes Arafat's behavior to a deceptive strategy, to discredit and eventually destroy Israel, more than whether this is an internal or external attribution, what matters is that such an attribution can be perceived as controllable and intended to be harmful to Israel. According to the model observed in Figures 1 and 2, these properties of the attributions cause high levels of anger and other negative emotions and increase the probability of hostile or aggressive responses, which in turn prevent negotiations and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Actor-Observer Discrepancies and the Ultimate Attribution Error. An important aspect of attribution processes in the area of interpersonal relations is the existence of biases, such as the fundamental

attribution error (e.g., Ross, 1977) and the actor-observer discrepancies (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Specifically, the fundamental attribution error refers to one's tendency to attribute other people's behavior to more dispositional causes, underestimating the importance of situational factors. The actor-observer discrepancies refer to an individual's tendency to attribute his or her own behavior to external causes while observers tend to attribute the same behavior to the internal dispositions of the actor.

In an early attempt to apply attribution theory to intergroup conflict, Pettigrew (1979) suggested that these kinds of biases, studied at the interpersonal level, also operate in environments of intergroup conflict. According to Pettigrew, a bias similar to these take place at the intergroup level, when members of a group make attributions about the behavior of their own people (in-group) versus the behavior of members of another group (outgroup). As in the case of the fundamental attribution error and the actor-observer discrepancies, Pettigrew formulated this intergroup bias in terms of locus (internal versus external) of attributions and not controllability or intentionality, which are the theoretically relevant aspects of attribution processes in the interpersonal domain.

For example, in the case of a negative behavior on the part of an in-group member, external causes are emphasized, while internal causes are emphasized for the negative behavior of out-group members. This pattern reverses for positive behavior, so that in-group behavior tends to be attributed to more internal factors while the out-group behavior tends to be attributed to more external factors. Other authors (e.g., Hewstone 1988; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974) applied similar views of these attributional biases to intergroup conflict in Southeast Asia, also in terms of the locus of causality concerning the attributions people made for the negative behavior of in-group and outgroup persons (e.g., their own versus another ethnic or religious group). The main limitation of these attempts to apply attribution principles to intergroup conflict and social violence is that, as indicated above, locus was the only aspect of attributions included in the analysis. Of course, since attributional research and theory development in interpersonal domains such as conflict and violence did not take place until more recently, it is understandable that those authors did not include controllability and intentionality.

More recently, Betancourt and his associates (e.g., Betancourt, 1995, 1991; Betancourt, Brown, &

Cimpoeru, 1991; Guthrie & Betancourt, 1991) developed a series of studies designed to extend the attribution-emotion model of conflict and violence (see Figures 1 and 2) to intergroup environments. A new version of the model, adapted to include the role of group biases was proposed and tested in a

number of behavioral domains. The model observed in Figure 3 includes all the variables and propositions of the original attribution-emotion model of conflict and violence (see Figure 1) plus those relevant to the extension of the model to social and intergroup phenomena.




Figure 3. Modified version of the conceptual Attribution-Emotion Model of Violence, extended to include situations of intergroup conflict, such as the judgments of violence perpetrated by members of different ethnic groups.

As observed in Figure 3, an additional feature of this conceptual model is that attributional thinking as well as emotions and reactions to an instigating or frustrating behavior are seen in part as a function of the attributional bias associated with group membership. Within the context of this model, group membership represents the potential effects of the ultimate attribution error, conceived here in terms of perception of intentionality and controllability, instead of locus as in Pettigrew's original formulation. Specifically, it is proposed that in environments of social conflict and violence, attributional thinking concerning the intentionality of a negative action and controllability of its cause are in part a function of group membership. Specifically, frustrating or negative actions performed by an ingroup member

are perceived as less intentional and caused by less controllable factors than similar actions performed by members of the outgroup. This, in turn, results in different levels of emotion and violence of responses to ingroup versus outgroup members. In addition, according to this model, it is possible that emotions and the response itself are also in part a function of the group-membership bias. Hence, the same action would result in more negative emotion and less positive ones when performed by an outgroup than when performed by an ingroup member. Similarly, the same behavior on the part of ingroup and outgroup members may result in more violent responses for the outgroup, independent of the effect of group on attributional thinking and emotions.

This model, including the reformulated conception

of the ultimate attribution error, has recently been tested in relation to conflict and violence in a number of domains of intergroup and social conflict. In the following section, a brief summary of some of that research is presented to illustrate the domains examined to test this model. In this case, situations of social conflict and violence, such as social judgment and reactions to violence perpetrated by Mainstream and Ethnic Minority individuals, in the U.S. and in South America were examined based on the model presented in Figure 3.

Ethnic Bias in Jury Decisions concerning Violent Crimes: The Case of Latino versus Anglo American Defendants. In a series of studies conducted in California, a mock-jury paradigm was used to examine the possible effects of social (ethnic) identity on the participants' attribution processes and reactions to violence in a multi-ethnic context. Subjects participated as jurors in a mock trial concerning a violent crime. The same case was presented to all groups (juries), except that four experimental conditions were created by manipulating two variables. First, the witness testimony indicated high versus low intentionality. Second, the defendant was given a "typical" Hispanic versus a "typical" Anglo last name. After the presentation of the case and before

final deliberations, in each of the resulting experimental conditions, jurors were required to provide individual answers to a questionnaire. This instrument included questions concerning perception of controllability and intentionality, emotions experienced toward the defendant, and their personal decisions concerning guilt and sentence.

Overall, the results confirmed the general propositions of the attribution-emotion model of conflict of violence. In addition, the ultimate attribution error, conceived as a biased effect of group membership on intentionality of a violent action and controllability of its cause for individuals identified as ingroup versus outgroup members was also confirmed. In order to illustrate the group-membership effect, Figure 4 shows a comparative analysis of the responses of Anglo (Mainstream) and Hispanic (ethnic minority) participants to one of the items on attributional thinking concerning the violent actions of the Anglo versus Hispanic defendant. As observed, both Anglo and Hispanic participants showed a bias (e.g., less intentionality) in favor of the perpetrator identified as their in-group member. Consistent with the model, group related discrepancies in attributional thinking resulted in discrepancies in the corresponding emotions, social judgment, and violence of sentence.




Figure 4. Comparative view of Anglo versus Hispanic jurors' perception of intentionality concerning a violent action perpetrated by Anglo versus Hispanic individuals in the USA.

A comparative analysis of the results for participants from other ethnic groups (Asian and African Americans) suggested that some characteristics of the group (e.g., values and beliefs) as well as the nature of the relationships between the groups (e.g., hostility) may influence these biases on the variables of the model.

Judgment and Reactions to Social Violence: The case of Mapuche versus Mainstream Chileans in South America. A series of studies to be conducted in Latin America was designed to test the same model and propositions studied in the research reported above concerning attribution processes, emotions, and responses to violence in conflict environments (Betancourt, 1995). One of these studies was conducted in Southern Chile and examined the judgments and reactions of Mainstream and Indigenous (Mapuche) Chileans concerning the use of violence to protest against discrimination and demand the return of ancestral territories. In addition to the measurement of the variables relevant to the test of the model for intergroup phenomena (see Figure 3), measures of a cultural value orientation found to be relevant to attributions of controllability (see Betancourt, Hardin, & Manzi, 1992; Betancourt & Lopez, 1993) were included in the study.

The research took place in 1993, within the context of a conflict and discontent on the part of the Mapuches who were protesting against discrimination and demanding the return of land they claimed belonged to their ancestors. The protests included the use of force to take over some of the land, public and private. In addition, with the support of college

students they had taken over the Campus of the main local university (Universidad de la Frontera) in Temuco. This is the capital city in the region of Araucania, which was historically the location of most of the "Reducciones Indígenas", similar to the reservations in the US. Today, about 30% of the population in the region is Mapuche.

Although the purpose of the study was to examine the same propositions of the violent-crime research conducted in California, the outcome measures were social judgment and approval of violence instead of verdict and violence of sentence. The participants were men and female "campesinos", between 15 and 25 years of age, of Mapuche versus Mainstream (mostly Hispanic) background. All of them had at least some high school education and had never lived in the city. Participants were asked about their judgments of the conflict, including perception of its causes, controllability (on the part of the Mapuches versus the Chilean government and society), intentionality, feelings toward the protesters, and the extent to which they endorsed the use of violence. In addition, a measure of value orientation (e.g., fatalism) and perceptions of who was responsible for the current problems and the solutions were included.

In order to illustrate the kinds of results obtained, Figure 5 shows one of the attributional variables, perception of controllability (on the part of the Mapuches as opposed to the government) over the causes of their problems. In addition, Figure 5 shows the extent to which the participants endorsed the use of violence on the part of the Mapuches if there is no just response and solution to their problems from the government.




Figure 5. Mapuche and Mainstream Chileans' perception of controllability of causal attributions (on the part of the Mapuches as opposed to the Government) for the problems of the Mapuche People, and approval of the use of violence by the Mapuches if there is no just solutions on the part of the Government.

Overall, differences between Mapuches and non-Mapuches in all measures were not significant. However, very much following the pattern seen in the case of perceived controllability (see in Figure 5), males and females scored significantly different in most of the measures. Second, differences in attributional thinking, as illustrated in Figure 5, were consistent with differences in emotions and judgments of social violence, generally confirming the theoretical model. As predicted by the model, lower scores on perception of controllability by the Mapuches (and higher controllability by the government) corresponded to higher levels of approval for the use of violence.

In a subsequent analyses similarities between the ethnic groups and differences between the genders were examined, and an additional study is underway to test various hypotheses concerning such differences. In general, it is apparent that the absence of a significant bias between Mapuche and Mainstream participants and a bias-consistent discrepancies in attributional thinking, emotions, and judgments of violence between males and females are a function of cultural value orientation. Specifically, while there were no significant differences between Mapuche and Mainstream participants on the value orientation related to fatalism, there were highly significant differences on this measure between the genders. Moreover, these differences in value orientation were consistent with the differences observed in attributional thinking, emotions, and judgments of conflict and violence. This suggests that the differences observed between the genders in attributional thinking, emotions, and judgments of violence, are at least in part a function of differences in cultural value orientation, which in this case are associated with the gender of the participants and not with their ethnic background. Hence, although the relationships between attributions, emotions, and responses to violence were confirmed, very much as in the jury decision research in California, in the case of Southern Chile the group bias was not a function of the ethnic group as much as of gender.

Discussion

Based on the results of a number of studies designed to extend the attribution-emotion model of conflict and violence (e.g., Betancourt & Blair, 1992) to the analysis of intergroup phenomena, there appears to be significant support for a model that

adds elements that are relevant to environments of intergroup and social conflict and violence. Specifically, biases associated with group membership in conflict environments are incorporated to account for discrepancies in cognitive processes, such as attributional thinking, between the different parties to a conflict. To this effect, the ultimate attribution error proposed by Pettigrew (1979) was reformulated to account for the attributional variables that, according to the attribution-emotion model of conflict and violence, are most relevant to interpersonal phenomena.

Overall, the results from a number of studies suggest that group membership is an important predictor of discrepancies in perception of the attributional properties that are, in turn, determinants of emotional reactions and violence of responses to a frustrating or instigating behavior. Nevertheless, it is important to note that although the group bias appears to be associated with group membership, ultimately such biases appear to be a function of other factors, such as cultural values, beliefs, and the nature of the relationships between the groups in question. Moreover, differences in value orientation, which appear to be at least one of the factors influencing the group biases in cognition, emotion, and action, may not necessarily be associated with ethnicity of the subjects but with other grouping factors. In the case of the Mapuches versus Mainstream Chileans, gender was more important than ethnicity as a determinant of the ultimate attribution error, which appeared to be a function of the differences in cultural value orientation between the genders.

In sum, the basic propositions of the original model plus those added to account for intergroup and social conflict and violence have been systematically confirmed, and the resulting attribution-emotion model of social and intergroup violence has been supported by evidence from studies in various domains of social conflict. In addition, there seems to be empirical evidence supporting the proposition that while group membership is a predictor of attributional patterns and their influence in responses to violence, beliefs, values and culture appear to be key determinants of the discrepancies associated with group membership.

This general approach to the study of social conflict may be useful in understanding the role of psychological processes in conflicts between a number of different groups. The results from the study of the groups and settings reported here are

only intended to illustrate the kinds of social conflict and violence to which the understanding of these psychological processes may contribute to. Conflicts associated with religious, political, and other groups in society may also benefit from the application of this model or some of its propositions. Of course, additional research is necessary to examine these processes in relation to conflict and violence in other settings and incorporate other potentially relevant variables to the analyses.

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